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4Local Government in Rural Central Java*
Rural settlement patterns on the island of Java ccnf orm in general
type to the dominant modo throughout the rcst of mensoa Asia: a nucleated
residential unit surrounded by the lands cultivated by the residents, for -
ing a commnity with political, econoric, and religicus dimensions. The
dominant form of agriculture depends upon irregated lands planted primarily
with rice. In upland areas, where the topography has limited the spread
of the irrigated land, the residential units are relatively small and
isolated, and a characteristic village organization has devoloped in which
the daily patterns of interaction can encompass the entire village. The
mch larger part of Java's population, however, lives in loland areas
where gentle even gradients, plentiful souircas o ter, 717atnd the eoa
rains have permitted the establishment of widepread systems of irigation.
Here the residential units have expanded and coalescdinto largo blckc2s
and strips of several square miles, altrnating with argc uninterrupted
areas of irrigated land. Under these conditions, villa units have exz-
panded far beyond the daily interaction group, and vaguely defined neigh-
borhoods (barisan or lingkungan) have developed within a'hich most of the
daily patterns of muatual interest and aid take place. Within the area
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2studied the average population of the lowland rural village is roughly
600, with a range from 200 to 2000. The average area encompassed by each
village is roughly 3/ 1 square mile, with a range approximately proportional
to the population.
Population density in the area studied (1,490 per square mile), which
includes both mountain and lowland areas, is substantially in excess of the
average Java-wide population density (1,000 per square mile).1 This
excess reflects the soil fertility and consequent relative prosperity of
the locality. The figure for the purely lowlAand portion of the area aver-
ages about 2,260 per square mile. This high, but by no means the highest
concentration of population in rural Java. The ratio of residential
(pekerangan) to agricultural (sawah and tegal) land varies from about
1:2.5 to 1:1. Density of settlement in residential areas is indicated by
the ratio of population to residential area, which usually varies between
5,000 per square mile and 7,500 per square mile. Such concentrations of
population extending over broad and continucus areas, scarcely answer our
conception of "rural" but are more comparable to surburban conditions in
the United States. Such densities are accompanied by a narrow scope of
social awareness, complete ignorance of and indifference toward those
living more than a short distance away. This high degree of what may be
called social density is an important factor in the political structure of
the village. Thus for all but a few occasions most soidal interaction is
limited to a geographical area of very small scope. In the village with
which I was most concerned, interest in the affairs of other families,
except close kin, for most people extended no farther than a radius of
100'to 150 yards.
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The population density of rural Java leads to a heavy incidence of
small urban and semi-urban centers. 2 In the area of study, these are lo-
cated at distances from each other of about ten to fifteen miles. They
serve primarily as centers for collection of agricultural produce, and
for the distribution of retail goods and services to the countryside.
Each has at least one local market where all kinds of retail goods may be
bought and where the small rural farmer or tradesman can bring his produce
for sale. The bulk of the rural cash produce passes through the hands of
a small group of town traders, formerly almost all Chinese, but now in-
cluding a number of Javanese. Another sector of the urban population serves
the countryman with prepared foods and small goods, repairs to equipment,
entertainment, and transportation. Finally every such center has an ad-
ministrative function, and contains a number of government officials and
their staffs. These centers, varying in size from ten to thirty thousand
people, are thickly scattered throughout Java. Very few villages are
located more than ten to fifteen miles from one of them.
Communications with more distant areas usually funnel down through
the local urban centers. Radios are non-existent in the villages. News-
papers and magazines reach only a very small fraction of the villagers,
though these are usually influential persons who relay some information to
a wider circle. A vast majority of the villagers, however, receive such
information by word of mouth from someone who has just returned from a
visit to one of the local towns. Most villagers have only the most casual
of contacts with town sources of information-a chat with a market vendor
or with those he may encounter in a cofee stall. The groups with special
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communication links beyond the immediate neighborhood and village are bigger
traders, well-to-do farmers who can maintain a wider network of kinship
communications, those men--often but not necessarily well-to-do--who for
one reason or another have taken advantage of opportunities to cultivate
relationships with townspeople, and higher village officials whose business
takes them frequently to central government offices. Their influence within
the village, especially that of the last group is reenforced by the prestige
which accrues from having town and government contacts. In addition to
such informal channels the Government Information Service from time to
time organizes meetings of the villagers to publicize and explain. important
government projects--a local anti-illiteracy program or most recently, the
forth-coming general electioms. Specific government services, particularly,
the Public Health Service, the Agricultural Service, and the Ministry of
Religion, also send out their officials to push their individual programs.
Beyond these occasional official visity, private political organizations
enter villages to hold public rallys and private meetings for their meetings
for their members. Information brought in through these channels seeps out
over the countryside through numberless casual conversations and discussions
at village coffee shops, guard posts, and road sides.
A very extensive network of roadways connect rural areas with each
other and the towns. Village houses are alligned symmetrically along
rectangular roadway grids, and the main roadways of each village contines
to othervillages and to main highways. The road network is thus not centered
upon a particular nearby town but rather stretches out symmetrically in all
directions. Towns and cities are linked by better surfaced and ballasted
5roads, normally all-weather and suitable for auto and truck transport.
Bus lines and small private jitneys connect all the towns and cities. The
transportation network is thus extensive, heavily traveled and technically
sufficient for most of the traffic demands. From the perspective of the
village it permits ready access to a variety of local markets, and brings
almost every villager at least occasionally into direct touch with the
nearby towns.
Over the last century of great economic changes and population increases
and shifts, large blocks of rural residents have moved into urban settings,
leorer v1 acnes have l*cn atratcld .t eit Traae anA Navudl occupstrs
and the proc ss has been constantly accelrtinj ;the children of the more
well-to-do to schooling and clerical or more advanced government service.
As a result, rural and urban societies share in a racially and ethnically
common population. There are strongly felt distinctions between them,
however, that set up a sharp dichotomy in their thinking between "we towns-
people" and "we villagers." The city and townsfolk are conceived to be
more refined, more aware of the wider world, more "advanced" in their think-
ing, yet more graspibng and materialistic, inhospitable, and unwilling to
work together. The villagers occupy the position in Javanese intellectual
thought of "Natural Man." They are ccnceived as a society of relative
equals, with no economic or political schisms, willing to share labor and
goods with each other, courteous, generous, and hospitable to cutsiders,
yet lacking refinement, backward, and ignorant. It is significant that
these contrasting conceptions are shared by both groups. These character-
izations reflect strongly held values in Javanese society but, within my
own experience of the rural population, they are to a very considerable
6extent mythical. In actual fact Java has a metropolitan-based civiliza-
tion that has for centuries penetrated down into rural society and set
the standards there for social rank, speech, dress, manners, art, and
music. Moreover, political influences from the urban-based royal courts
have primarily determined the formal structure of village government, and
economic influences from these courts have stimulated a cash economy in
the areas by requiring taxes in cash since at least as early as the 17th
century.3
Social rank in village society is well-defined and depends upon
economic position, relationship to rank in the official hierarchy, and
ability to maintain urban standards of social value. Economic position
is primarily defined in terms of landholdings. There are two types of
landholding, free hold (jasan) with free rights of disposal, and shares
in village communal land (kongsen) with limited disposal rights. Both
types are inheritable. It is interesting to note in this connection that
landowners are almost all small holders; a household owning five acres
of land is rated well-to-do. The distribution of local ownership' is il-
lustrated by the following figures based upon a reasonably representative
desa in the area studied.
ca. 400 families own no land
181 less than 1 1/4 acres
149 " " from 1 1/4 to 2 1/2 acres
89 " from 2 1/2 to 5 acres
60 " " from 5 to 12 1/2 acres
4 more than 12 1/2 acres
7It should be noted that the great majority of the non-landowners
tabulated above are families early in marriage living on land held by
their parents. It is worth noting in this connection that no antagonistic
interest groups based on differences of landownership have yet developed.
Absentee landlordism is not a serious factor in village power structure,
and assumes economic importance only close to certain urban centers.
While economic differentiation is relatively slight, social gradations
are considerable. The two great economic scarcities are cash and land.
Patterns of kinship and neighborship are used to establish sets of rela-
tionships between social unequals; the scarcities go down and in exchange
services go up. The ability and willingness of a well-to-do man to main-
tain such relationships are very important factors contributing to his
social and political status. In addition, the presence of urban standards
within the village together with the great respect granted public office
provide a scale of symbols for the ettablishment of position and the
accordance of respect that commands universal social prestige. The
existence of a well-developed social hierarchy based upon an urbar scale
of values makes it difficult to characterize Javanese rural society as
peasant in nature.
The system of kinship throughout the Javanese-speaking aroa is bi-
lateral in descent, mostly bilocal in residence-with noolocal as an
alternative--and with no corporate bodies of kin beyond the immediate
family. Under these conditions kinship ties are individual or single
family affairs, rather than the joint concern of any wider kinship body.
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The immediate family of father, mother, and children has a very high degree
of social and economic autonomy . Kinship ties are maintained by the ability
to reciprocate in an exchange of goods and services. For most individuals
interaction beyond the village with relatives other than immediate family
members is infrequent and limited to a close circle of kin. The more
well-to-do can support a wider network of kin relationship, although in
general they maintain ties only with those distant relatives from whom
social advantage can be gained. Bilateral descent as the overwhelming
mode of descent leads to the rapid fragmentation of property from genera-
tion to generation, and social privileges and hence social rank tend to
vary acccrdingly. There is a constant turn-over of wealth and position.
The heirs of the well-to-do mst be economically effective to maintain
their positions, for the heavy drain upon cash, and the absence of secure,
effortless forms of investment mean that the real property each family
can maintain matches very closely its actual economic ability.
There is a mijor social dichoto4my in contral Javanese society based
upon religious differences which affects even the most remote rural area.
On one side are those oriented toward the ritual and benefits of orthodox
Islam, termed bangsa muslimin or bangsa artri. On the other, are those
oriented toward more traditional systems of Javanese philosophy, theology,
and arts, and strongly anti-Moslem. Abangan is a common Javanese village
term for this group. Normally these factions follow community lines, and
whole villages or neighborhoods will feel allegiance to one side or the
other. This dichotomy varies in intensity from area to area and village
to village. In some communities the synthesis achieved early in the
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islamization of Java between the traditional Javanese theology and that
of Islam still dominates the society; in others, the dichotomy varies in
intensity in proportion as this synthesis has broken down under orthodox
Islam pressures on the one hand and countervailing religious and political
pressures on the other. Village officials equally share this bias and,
where the split is intense, village elections are normally decided by the
voting strength of each faction. This rift has deep historical roots,
going back to the introduction of Islam in the 13th and 14th centruies.
It only began to have political significance, however, with the growth
of a nationalist movement in the second and third decades of this century.
There is good evidence as a matter of fact that this split has become
severe in the rural areas only since national independence in 1945. In
the immediate area studied, serious political competition between the two
factions started immediately after independence and culinated in bitter-
ness with the so-called Madiun Affair in 1948.5 While actual violence did
not extend to the area studied, relationships between MosIem and non-
Moslem communities in this area were badly strained, to the point that in
certain severe cases communications between neighboring villages have
broken down.6
II
Settlement in the area studied is relatively recent, and took place
rapidly during the 19th century. As a result, individual settlement units
had no time to send out separate sub-settlements; instead, settlements
expanded until they coalesced with others or until a balance was reached
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between residential and cultivated land. Each village unit (dukuhan) 7
is the expanded core of an original settlement. It has its own communal
shrine, which symbolizes the spiritual influence of the original founder;
its own communal land, held by the village as a corporate body; and its
own governmental apparatus which includes a system for levying communal
labor for village work. The members of each village have a considerable
degree of identification with each other, an esprit de corps that helps
make effective the strongly felt value of social harmony. In the older
settled areas of central Java, to the west of the area studied, village
complexes exist in which one village is recognized to be the "mother"
village, the others, offshoots. In such complexes, village loyalties and
a sense of identification extend over the whole group. Patterns of com-
minal cooperation and mutual aid exist between such villages, and the
entire complex is usually united under the office of a single headman.
This kind of complex apparently served as a model for the structure
of rural administration under at least the last Javanese empire of Mataram
(ca. 1590-1800) and under Dutch administration as well. Under the Javanese
kingdoms all land was crown land, and was distributed among the royal
officials roughly in proportion to rank. At least by the Mataram period
in the central Javanese areas exposed to strong royal penetrations the
desa headman had been absorbed into the court hierarchy as a direct or
indirect royal appointee.8 At this time the basic unit of administration
seems in general to have been the village complex referred to above (Java-
neset kalurahan; Indonesian: desa). The traditional staff of desa
assistants under such local appointees crystallized around these communities
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and constituted the formal system of authority roles which is standard
today. Under Dutch administration this system was standardized and ex-
tended to consolidate the entire rural area of the island of Java. The
desa head (lurah) was thus initially a member of the imperial bureaucracy
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with advancement possible into the higher levels of government. Further-
more, the office tended to become hereditary, helping to establish a kind
of petty aristocracy vith court ties within village society,. About 1875,
the "liberal" politi.cal movement in Europe began to make itself felt in
Dutch colonial administration and, among other changes, the office of
lurah wras gradually made elective. One of the effects of submitting this
office to local elections was to place the lurah in a much more intimate
reltationship to the villagers and thus set him apart from higher govern-
w.antal levels. At the same time the growth of the urban sector of Java-
nese society led to its acquisition of a monopoly over higher positions
in government and a consequent shutting off of village heads from political
advancement. This change took place during the latter part of the Dutch
era, occuring gradually between about 1875 and 1920. Simultaneously thore
was a gradual rise to local dominance of orthodox Moslem headmen, replacing
the more traditionally oriented line of appointees.
Later, the Dutch administration began a program of consolidating
village government to reduce the administrative burden and the size of
staffs. Desa's were combined by two's and three's into single units, and
dukuhan's were similarly combined and their severnment apparatus amalgamated.
The consolidation was not successful however in creating a new sense of
unity between the combined dukuhan's. The original village unit retained
its own identity, esprit de corps, centr'al shrine, anu coatrol over its
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own communal land and labor. Today, these are still the units referred to
when the local Javanese use the term "village." With the fall of the
Japanese, there was in many villages a popular upsurge of resentment against
the desa government officials, most of whom had been forced to cooperate
with the Japanese in the initiation of harsh measures. In many cases,
the lura was deposed and a member of the opposite faction, often the
anti-Moslem group, was elected in his stead. Thus a more even balance
was reached between these two factions at the desa level.
After national independence, certain limited changes were introduced
in the traditional village constitution. The assistant desa offices were
all made elective, rather than appointive by the desa head. This change
has become permanent, and has substantially reduced the patronage available
to the desa head, as well as his control over outlying dukuhan's. Shortly
after the fall of Japan, on the initiative of the new Government of the
Republic, elective committees were formed in each desa to assist and check
the authority of the headman and other desa officials. This change swept
rapidly through desa 's in the area studied on a wave of popular enthusiasm.
The innovation failed after about a year, however, in almost all cases
because of the inability of the desa to rer,unerate the committee members
with land or money. The committee members were unwilling to put much time
into the work, and chronic friction between them and the desa officials
disrupted the administration of the desa. As a result the new system was
dropped completely in the area studied, with the consent of both the villagers
and the central government .10
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A very important political phenomena in post-war Java has been the
remarkable proliferation of private organizations and their penetration
into village society. In central Java joint economic and political action,
aside from that possible through the chain of pair relationships among
kin and neighbors, can be initiated only within an organizational frame-
work, complete with a formal structure of leadership. Informal groupings
for such purposes do not exist. As a consequence, local government has
had in the past a near monopoly over the power to initiate such action.
Since national independence, however, the private organizations among the
urban sector of the population, particularly certain political associations,
have begun to organize in the village. They have been received with
mixed feelings. On the one hand, the villagers admire the "advanced"
nature of these urban exports and prestige accrues to their local leaders.
On the other, they resent the way such organizations disrupt the sense
of village unity. In strongly Moslem villages, however, where there has
been a longer history of such organizations, reinforced by religious
sanctions, they have been better received. Even so, in Moslem as well
as non-Moslem villages, their membership consists principally of persons
in some way oriented toward urban values and thus of higher social rank.
Despite such limltations these organizations are becomi;ng increasingly
effective. Their leaders exert pressure upon the desa and dukuhan govern-
ments to secure privileges for themselves and their supporters. They work
for the election of favorably inclined desa officials and organize efforts
to effect the dismissal of officials friendly to the opposite faction. All
such organizations are aligned on one side or the other of the Moslem vs.
9
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non-Moslem dichotomy, and are usually linked through the towns with nation-
wide organizations. Their activities have had a great deal to do with
the intensification of strain between communities of opposite religious
inclination. The issues they exploit in rural areas all relate to the
central religious problem and are all nation-wide in scope--polygamy and
women's rights in general, laws concerning marriage and divorce, theolog-
ical differences between orthodox Moslem and traditional Javanese religious
beliefs, the question of support for parochial (i.e., Moslem) schools,
etc. In the non-Moslem villages, these activities increasingly bring the
new organizations into conflict with the village officials. Though usually
sympathetic with a political faction, many officials resent the pressures
brought to bear, and dislike the threat to social harmony implicit in the
presence of such organizations. In Moslem villages, however, integration
of the officials with the dominant political organizations is much more
complete, and such conflict is uncommon.
III
Local government in present-day Java lieS at the bottom of a series
of administrative units of diminishing size arranged in even levels each
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of which has grouped under it a set of units of the next lower level. In
their form and in the functions of their officials these units closely
parallel each other. Authority is strongly centralized and chains of
command carefully worked out and strictly adhered to. The selection of
officials for all but the bottom two (village) levels is by appointment
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of the central government. Lately, local bodies of elected representa-
tives have been created at the third level of administration (kabupaten)
to stand beside the central government and apply the checks of representa-
tive government at this level.
One of the critical planes cutting across this system lies between
the fifth (katjamatan) and sixth (desa) levels, for it is here that the
closest contact occurs between the local population and the central govern-
ment. Above this plane, the officials are all appointed by the central
government. They are mostly town-bred and town-oriented, comparatively
well-educated, often not fror the local area, and are frequently rotated
from region to region. Their loyalties and hopes for advancement are
directed toward the higher levels of the central government. Below this
plane, the officials are elected (with permanent tenure) by the populations
of their administrative units, depend heavily for support upon their neigh-
borhood groups, have not normally acquired superior educations, and iden-
tify themselves largely with the values of the rural population. There is
no chance for advancement through the sixth to the fifth level. These
officials may be deposed by local agitation bringing sufficient pressure
to bear upon the higher administrative levels, or by action of higher
levels independent of local feeling. Thus the officials of the lowast
levels--desa and dukuhan--are subject to pressures and severe sanctions
from above and below.
The desa as an administrative unit draws together from two to seven
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or eight villages, with from four to five the mode. In the area studied,
the average rural lowland desa has a population of about 3,200 with an
area of 1 1/4, square miles. The desa consists of a set of dukuLhan govern-
ments capped by a single headman (Iurah) with a small staff of specialists
who serve the entire desa. The members of the desa government thus consist
of two groups: those attached to the central desa government , and those
attached to each dukuhan government. The former are the desa secretary
(Tjarik), desa Islamic religious official (Modin), and the desa irrigation
official (Djogotirto). These three officials, in addition to their sub-
ordinate position to the lurah, have special ties to agencies of the central
government. The secretary is primarily responsible for the various kinds
of census material required by the central government, and in addition
has delegated to him by the lurah the task of accounting and conveying
tax money to the local office of the Interior Ministry. The special skills
required of the secretary give him a prestige second only to that of the
lurah, though normally he has no authority over the other village offi-
cials, The religious official attends to legal matters that come under the
control of hukum or religious law, e.g. the initiation of marriage, divorce
and related property settlements, and inheritance. Furthermore, the Modin
is called upon to conduct the ritual for funerals. For this occasion, his
services are called upon by every family regardless of political faction,
and this role secures him widespread good will.
Irrigation water is received from an irrigation system operated by
the national government. Each desa '_as control over the distribution of
its own watert. The irrigation official is res'ponsible to the Iurah for
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the proper maintenance of the irrigation canals and dams, and for the
supervision of the distribution scheme decided upon by vote of the land-
holders. He is also the liaison man between the desa and the Irrigation
Service, which operates the government system and passes on decisions con-
cerning inter-desa irrigation problems. Water is a burning issue during
the dry season, and occasionally the farmers of some dukuhan may resist,
even by violence, changes ordered in inter-deza distribution by the Irri-
gation Service. Such forrs of resistance rarely gain their ends, since
the central government police together with the desa officials act firmly
to enforce the government regulations.
Below the desa one encounters the basic unit of local government,
the dukuhan or village. This has a head (Eamitua) and under him a staff
consisting of at least one security or police official (djogobojo), and
at least one herald or messenger (kebajan). Traditionally the police
offical is responsible for calling out and overzeeing the nightly village
watch and for reporting to the central government - on orders from the
desa head -- any crimes or serious misdemeanors. He is also the first called
to the scene of crime, fighting, serious accident or emergency. The herald
transmits orders, summons, and notices from the desa or dukuhan head to
the individual villagers. He is the direct, though essentially passive,
initiator of action; for without an official notice -- even though aware
of the occasion - the villagers will not begin to assemble for any official
activity. In practice the holders of these two offices usually share most
of their official duties and divide their work on the basis of neighbor-
hocds. As a consequence of the consolidation of dukuhan governments, many
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villages have been left with only a partial dukuhan staff . Under these
conditions, the village unit turns to the senior of the remaining officials
in length of service as its de facto head, and the subordinate roles are
taken over by the junior officials, if any. This distribution of official
activities on the basis of locality rather than assigned roles reflects
the primary function the villagers expect from their officials, i.e. act-
ing as the responsible agent for the local group in dealings between that
group or any member thereof and government at higher levels.
Conversely, the dukuhan head is also the normal funnel through which
contacts pass from higher levels of government to members of the dukuhan.
Contacts by the desa head with a dukuhan member are made only through the
channels of dukuhan government, while representations to the desa head by
a villager for any reason, e.g. securing papers for travel, marriage, divorce,
transfer of land, a dispute with a member of a different dukuhan are made
in the company of his dukuhan head.
Authority structure in village government, as in other levels of ad-
ministration, is pyramidal. Decisions for final action of any kind must
be made by the head of the administrative level concerned. Within the dukuhan,
decisions on the allocation of comimunal labor, on requests to the desa
for maintenance and repair funds, on the time and form of village cele-
brations, on participation by the village members in some projected cen-
tral government program, all must be made in the last instance by the
dukuhan head. The process of decision-making in informal, non-official
circumstances has a fairly general pattern. The proposition for action
is initiated by the party most iceenly interested in seeing the action
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carried out. He or they propose it individually or in small informal
groups to those whose support or consent must be gained. Arguments pro
and con, followed by some kind of head count of opinion are not used.
No overt decision ever appears to be taken. Instead, the absence of ob-
jections is taken to connote consent, and the initiator and his party
immediately set out to execute the action. Any objections raised and counter
discussions are always delicately phrased to avoid direct contradiction,
which Javanese etiquette forbids. The task of gaining zupport and talking
down objections rests with the initiators. Factors of social influence,
such as those previously mentioned, bear strongly upon the effectiveness
of individual discussants. Other things being equal, however, the more
aggressive speaker, acting with due propriety, will gain his point. If
any objections persist, and the Javanese are very sensitive to the nuances
of expression that indicate objection, the proposal is tacitly dropped.
Decision-making in an official setting shares these characteristics, but
also contains the authoritarian element. The lower the level of adminis-
tration, the less there is of the' latter. At the dukuhan level, the ele-
ment of authority, though present, is distinctly subdued. In the decision-
making process, the dukuhan head acts normally as first among equals in
conjunction with his officials and influential members of the village.
The role of desa head permits a greater amount of authority to be
exercised in the decision-making process . The of fice carries considerably
more prestige than that of dukuhan head. Weekly meetings are held at which
the desa head passes on directives and information he has received from
the central government. Decisions are reached on the details of necessary
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desa activity and the budgeting of desa funds, with the desa head having
the final say.
The desa headman is also the point of contact for any central govern-
ment action; all entrances into the village, for any official purpose what-
soever, must be channeled through him. Affairs that involve an individual's
or dukuhan's obligations to the central government - payment of taxes,
maintenance of minimum standards of sanitation and order, participation
in certain government projects, obedience to government laws and directives
all move through this office, and the desa head is held responsible by
the government for the orderly discharge of these obligations. Ineffec-
tiveness or negligence may be cause for dismissal. This responsibility
is the crux of the relationship between desa head and dukuhan head. Govern-
ment pressure is applied directly to the former, never to the latter.
The former needs the cooperation of his dukuhan heads to discharge his
responsibilities. He may request the government to dismiss any subordinate
official who has violated his orders; if found to be justified, such a're-
quest is usually granted. But he must take care that the local loyalties
disturbed by this action will not result in loss of necessary cooperation.
The critical balance lies between authority exercised and cooperation
secured. The greater the physical or social distance between the desa
head 's village and a particular dukuhan, the more authority must yield to
dukuhan autonomy. In one desa studied, severe factional antagonism led
to the desa head 's authority being reduced to a shadow in a village of
the opposite faction.
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The level of administration directly above the desa is entirely a
part of the central government bureaucracy. The relations between this
level (katjamatan) and the desa are strongly authoritarian. Most inter-
action takes place at weekly conferences between katjamatan head (Tjamat)
and the head of the fifteen to twenty desa's under him. These are rarely
decision-making groups. Decisions fully formed are passed down; any ob-
jections and complaints are respectfully passed up and small details worked
out. The existence of objections rarely reverses a decision. The pat-
tern of interaction at these conferences is modelled on the teacher-pupil
relationship. The Tjamat instructs and admonishes; the lurah's answer
queries, take notes, and raise hands to ask questions or make suggestions,
but seldom offer direct objections. Traditionally, the central govern-
ment has maintained a close interest in all aspects of village affairs.
Its directives and admonitions thus cover a wide range of minor and major
matters. The lurah has, however, two means of opposition. He filters
out those minor directives he feels are impracticable and softens the
application of the more unpopular. Again occasionally during a conference,
the lurah's jointly balk at some proposal or decision by simply remaining
silent and failing to make the proper verbal responses. If they remain
in adamant in this way, there is nothing the Tjamat can do but accept the
situation gracefully.
The desa head thus acts as a buffer between the villagers and higher
levels of authority. At the present t.me, the scope of desa autoncmy is
in a state of partial flux. Popular political thinking in the country
favors sharp limitations on the authoritarian exercise of government
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control and a widening of the scope of local autonomy. This change is
being worked out at the desa-katjamatan level mainly through pulling and
hauling between the Tjamat and the desa heads. The size of funds the
desa may handle to finance its own projects, and the control it may ex-
ercise over its corporate land are the points most frequently at issue.
This again reflects the two major scarcities, cash and iard..
The growth of public feeling against authoritarian government is fur-
ther reflected in the attitudes of many Iurah"s toward the central govern-
ment. They resent attempts to force changes within the desa by direct
edict, are antagonistic toward Tjamat 's who try to exercise their full
authority, and enthusiastically admire any lurah bold enough to directly
challenge this authority. The growth of a spirit of independence of both
the villagers toward their officials and the officials toward the central
government has considerably loosened the controls of government at the
local level.
Taxation in the villages draws upon the land and labor of the villa-
gers rather than their cash. A certain amount of land is owned commnally
by each dukuhan. The amount varies from village to village, but within
each, it is fixed and inalienable. A portion of this is set aside for the
use of the dukuhan and desa officials as recompense for their services.
The proportions vary considerably from desa to desa, but in the area
studied, land alloted to office holders in each desa averages roughly
1/9 to 1/10 of the desa's agricultural land. The amounts per official
may be varied by popular vote of the whole desa, and such a decision is
binding upon each dukuhan. A furthezr amount of land is exploited for
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the account of the desa treasury (there are usually no dukuhan treasuries),
and its receipts are used for capital expenses of the desa. The amount
of communal land assigned for this purpose is approved by popular vote.
In some desa's no land has been appropriated for this purpose, and cash
for desa expenses is raised by occasional levies initiated by the desa
head and approved by popular vote. In any event, the amount of land ap-
propriated or cash levied is very small. Budgeting disbursements are
decided at meetings of the desa officials, and as previously stated, the
lurah has the final word in such decisions.
Labor for community projects is generally secured as a form of tax
from the villagers. The compulsory labor pools are organized by dukuhan's.
The labor that nust be performed within the limits of a dukuhan is provided
from the labor pool of that dukuhan. The types of communal labor are
graded, and each household is liable for service according to the type
of land it owns or holds by communal right. The liability varies slightly
from village to village, depending upon local tradition. The labor levy
is strictly rotated, and books are kept at the dukuhan head's office to
ensure that the levy is equitably spread. Labor is raised for the nightly
watch, clearing irrigation canals, repairing roads, bridges, dams, public
buildings, etc.
The central government also levies taxes on the villagers. Formerly,
during Dutch times and earlier, villagers were required to provide a
certain amount of free labor for central government tasks. This has been
discontinued. Central government taxes are now assessed on certain types
of visible assets deemed to be productive, i.e., land and vehicles for
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transport or hire, and levied wholly in cash. The assessment is a flat
fee for each kind of vehicle and unit of land of each class, based on the
estimated productive capacity of that type of good. It is thus not a
direct income tax. The rates for assessment are set by the central govern-
ment, which retains all the tax receipts after deductions of the Turah's
commission. Each household with an assessed tax must make payment to the
local dukuhan head or directly to the lurah. The tax ledgers are kept
at the lurah's office, and receipts are checked off against them, then
transmitted to the central government. The lurah is responsible for any
mishandling of receipts and receives 8 per cent of the receipts as com-
pensation for this task and responsibility.
The desa has no juridical powers to try offenders or render decisions
in disputes. Armed police power and the judicial apparatus are reserved
to the central government. The lower courts are circuit courts with
jurisdiction to handle mainly minor offenses such as assault and petty
theft . These courts travel to governmental centers of the kawedanan
(fourth) level. Higher courts with jurisdiction to handle civil suits,
appeals and cases of major crime are located in the cities and larger
towns, at the kabupaten (third) and higher levels of government. In-
dividual complainants can secure legally enforceable decisions only frcam
such courts. In practice however, disputes and cases of personal injury
rarely reach the local courts, but are settled at the desa and dukuhan
level. The desa or dukuhan head is sought out by the offended party and
asked to act as a mediator in order to secure for the plaintiff some sort
of restitution. Similarly an offended person from another desa goes
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to the offender 's lurah and presents his case for adjustment. The head-
man does not act as an arbitrator rendering a decision intended to secure
justice. Rather his dominant purpose is to make peace. The headnn through
private'talks brings pressure to bear upon both parties to agree to some
kind of settlement. The nature of the final settlement is determined
by who is willing to yield the most to being a restoration of peace.
This pressure for harmony is a major social sanction which, coupled with
the influence that goes with official position, allows the headman to
succeed in almost every instance. The settlement is not legally binding,
and either party, if still dissatisfied, may take the case to a govern-
ment court, but the villager has a horror of getting so involved. Further-
more, public opinion strongly condems the resort to courts as an act that
destroys the ties of kinship or neighborhood.
Only the selection of officials is decided by regular elections.
Other decisions that require full desa or village approval are made at
special meetings, at which all residents aged 18 years or over and all
married women of any age have a voice. Such meetings are usually ini-
tiated only by the desa or dukuhan government. Any changes in desa tax
levies, in apportionment of corporate village land, in land allotted to
office-holders, and in the division of irrigation water, must be approved
by a full meetings of desa or dukuhan members. Proposals for such changes
or for the setting up of some special project such as building a school or
public meeting house, or establishing a desa cooperative may be initiated
by the central government, the desa or dukuhan government, or some
political organization or influential figure able to gather sufficient
local support in favor of a meeting. During such a meeting matters are
not decided by voting. The aim rather is to secure essential unanimity.
Objection are freely offered especially by politically conscious young
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men. Explanations, oratory and modifications of the proposal are advanced
to achieve amity, but if the block of objectors is at all substantial and
remains adamant the meeting is adjourned and the proposal tacitly dropped
or postponed. If there are few sustained objections, the leaders of the
meeting makes strenuous attempts to elicit vocal evidence of positive
support. If unsuccessful, the meeting is continued until the objections
are determined or support evinced and the matter is decided accordingly.
After independence the central government first required that such
meetings be held regularly. In the immediate area of fieldwork at least
these meetings so intensified factionalism that much bitterness was aroused.
Rules of etiquette for informal discussion were ignored and open arguments,
charges and counter-charges were exchanged in a manner deeply offensive
to Javanese feelings. Finally, at the behest of the local officials per-
mission was granted to discontinue the regular meetings, and at present
they are only held when necessary.
Village officials are elected for life, but may be dismissed from
office by central government officials for malfeasance and gross incom-
.petence. In practice, if sufficient resistance can be mobilized in the
desa or dukuhan, pressure can be effectively brought to bear upon the
central government to remove an official. In one dukuhan the village
herald, an elderly man, took a young woman for a second wife. The dis-
parity in their ages threw into sharp relief the political issue of poly-
gamy, an issue on which the Moslems are on the defensive. Seizing upon
this issue, a youth organization aligned on the non-Hoslem side succeeded
in stirring up strong local resistance against the herald . A large part
027
of the village simply refused to heed the notices the herald delivered
from the desa and dukuhan heads. Government business there came to a
standstill. The desa head was forced to secure from the central govern-
ment the dismissal of the herald, and a new election was held in which
the candidate supported by the youth organization gained the office.
This kind of politicking goes on constantly in the village, initiated by
those with some claim to social influence. The various officials both
participate in this politicking and at the same time seek to mitigate its
effects for the sake of harmony.
The power and profits that can be derived from village office-holding,
especially from the office of desa headman, are considerable. The at-
tached land rights yield control over a relatively substantial amount of
land, which inturn permits the establishment of a number of power relation-
ships with sharecroppers. The lurah's control over the ingress of central
government gives opportunities for selection of friends as agents for
the distribution of government aid. The desa and dukuhan headmen's con-
trol over the activities of political organizations, together with their
political prestige give considerable advantage to their respective fac-
tions. These factors, together with the general growth of political
factionalism, help to create the increasingly intense struggles of local
politics.
Thus the outstanding problem facing contemporary Javanese society,
both rural and urban, is the intensifying bitterness since independence
between the Moslem and non-Moslem political factions. The problem is
keenly felt within village society and causes a great deal of concern and
6. 40
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uneasiness. Very little effective action is being taken by any segment
of the general public to ease this strain. Very few private organizations
are able to maintain a middle position and provide any kind of bridge be-
tween the two groups. Local officialdom, however, has been exceedingly
effective in keeping the peace. Their policy, both at the desa and higher
levels, is one of firmness coupled with a balancing of favors to either
side. Provocative political displays and demonstrations are kept to a
minimum, and, where possible, representatives from both factions are drawn
into joint public activities. A skillful Turah can be particularly ef fec-
tive with such a policy, and there are a suprisingly large number of such
Turah's.
Another major problem felt by villagers is the increasing number of
families who hold no farmland. The most frequently recurrent issue aris-
ing from this problem is the distribution of the corporate village land.
Proposals growing out of this issue, initiated either by a political
organization or by some influential neighborhood figure, may gather suffi-
cient support to cause the desa or dukuhan head to call a full village
or desa meeting. As a result of such meetings, several villages have
made decisions to increase the number of holdings, and to cut the size
of office land (bengkok) in order to distribute the saving among families
without farm land. In certain areas where all or a large part of the
farm land is communally owned, lines of interest are being drawn between
the hereditary shareholders and the increasing number of families with
no rights, who can only wait for some hereditary line to die out. Again
the villagers are aware of this, and feel deeply unhappy over the resultant
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growth of factionalism. It is this kind of threat to social harmony felt
by all that causes even a majority to be willing to yield some of its
rights.
IV
National plans for local government envisage sweeping cbanges, on
paper at least. They aim at widening the scope of local autonomy and
providing each autonomous area with a larger share of its tax receipts.
Desa units would accordingly become more self-sufficient. In order to
finance a wider range of governmental seevices, however, existing desa's
would have to be amalgamated into much larger units . Under these circum-
stances local officials are expected to become more specialized and to
have wider territories within their jurisdiction. It is not possible to
say, however, if or when these plans will be put into effect. Major poli-
tical and economic obstacles stand in the way.
Given an increasingly dense population, it is easy td see that a dras-
tic consolidation of governmental functions is needed to produce any
great advance in governmental services. At the same time- it is hard to
see how such consolidation can be effected given the villager's attitudes
toward government and the high degree of "social density," existing in
the countryside. Until the small illage groups are broken up by diver-
sification of occupations and more regular, fast transportation linking
towns and villages, rural social life will continue to center around the
neighborhoods, and local officials will continue to be treated as general
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purpose mediators with the higher levels of government regardless of their
assigned functions. Aside, therefore, from the possibility of sweeping
governmentally initiated changes, the present system appears to have con-
siderable promise of stability.
The most explosive issue for the imediate future is the power struggle
between the Moslem and non-Moslem factions. General elections are sched-
uled for the very near future. While they have been postponed before and
may be again, it now seems certain they will be held in the reasonably
near future. The Moslem parties hope to gain an absolute majority in the
national parliament, and if successfull they avowedly aim to create a
state with a constitution based upon Koranic law. The non-Moslems are
fighting this possibility bitterly, partly on religious grounds and partly
through fear that such a constitution would weight the government heavily
with offices requiring orthodox Moslem personnel. How such a general
eletion would turn out is not at all certain. The Moslem faction is
by far the better organized, particularly in the rural areas, but for
the most part has reached its organizational limits there. The non-Moslem
political groups, especially the more left-wing elements, are very busily
and effectively organizing the non-Moslem villages. Whatever course
the election may take, it appears that the dichotomy between the two fac-
tions will be increasingly sharpened and that more and more villages will
align themselves clearly with one side or the other.
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